Relative consumption preferences and public provision of private goods by König, Tobias & Lausen, Tobias
www.ssoar.info
Relative consumption preferences and public
provision of private goods
König, Tobias; Lausen, Tobias
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
König, T., & Lausen, T. (2016). Relative consumption preferences and public provision of private goods. (Discussion
Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung,
Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2016-213). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH.
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156329
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor







König, Tobias; Lausen, Tobias
Working Paper
Relative consumption preferences and public
provision of private goods
WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-213
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: König, Tobias; Lausen, Tobias (2016) : Relative consumption preferences
and public provision of private goods, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP II 2016-213,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156329
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you





WZB Berlin Social Science Center 
Research Area 









Put your  




Relative Consumption Preferences and Public 
Provision of Private Goods 
 
Discussion Paper 
SP II 2016–213 
December 2016 
 









Tobias König, Tobias Lausen 
Relative Consumption Preferences and Public Provision of Private Goods 
Affiliation of the authors: 
Tobias König 
Humboldt University of Berlin 
WZB Berlin Social Science Center 
Tobias Lausen 
Liebnitz University Hannover 
 
 
Copyright remains with the author(s). 
Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work 
in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and 
academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not 
constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The 
discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective 
author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. 









Relative Consumption Preferences and Public Provision of Private 
Goods 
by Tobias König and Tobias Lausen* 
This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure 
efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals have relative consumption 
concerns. By providing private goods, governments directly intervene in the consumption 
structure, and thereby have an instrument to correct for the excessive consumption of 
positional goods. We identify sufficient conditions when the public provision of private 
goods is always Pareto-improving, even when (linear) consumption taxes are available. In 
fact, with the public provision of private goods, there are cases where first-best allocations 
can be achieved, and a luxury tax on the positional good is redundant. 
Keywords: Public Provision, Social Preferences, Status-Seeking 
JEL classification: H42, D62, D63 
 
                                                 
*  E-mail: tobias.koenig@wzb.eu, lausen@sopo.uni-hannover.de. 
 We thank Paul Heidhues, Steffen Huck, Dorothea Kübler, Andreas Wagener, Georg Weizsäcker and 
seminar participants in Aarhus, Berlin, Gothenburg, Manchester, Munich, Lisbon and Taormina 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the German Research 
Association (DFG) through the Collaborative Research Center Transregio CRC TRR 190 is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1 Introduction
To a substantial extent, countries provide goods to their citizens that are essentially
private in nature, such as health care, child care, education, and nutritional assistance.1
From a traditional economic perspective, the public provision of private goods is puzzling.
Given that these goods and services are typically available in private markets, replacing
public provision with equivalent cash payments should actually increase welfare, people
can then choose the consumption bundle that best suits their interest. Several explana-
tions for this public provision puzzle have been put forward in the normative economics
literature, including paternalism or merit good arguments (Musgrave, 1959; Besley, 1988),
motives of redistribution under informational constraints (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982;
Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Besley and Coate, 1991), and notions of equality of op-
portunity (Gasparini and Pinto, 2006). In this paper, we provide an alternative rationale:
We argue that the public provision of private goods can correct for the inefficiencies arising
from individuals’ concern for positional or relative consumption.
While the traditional view of the inefficiency of in-kind spending assumes that individ-
uals only derive utility from goods and services per se, there is growing evidence that
is consistent with the idea that consumers’ choices and satisfaction are also affected by
the social comparisons they make: individuals seem to relate their absolute consumption
levels to that of “referent” others and feel pleasure when they possess more than their
social peers, and discomfort when they possess less (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick and
Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007; Charles et al., 2009; Heffetz, 2011; Kuhn et al.,
2011; Mechtel and Friehe, 2014; Roth, 2014). For instance, individuals enjoy their new
car, but they feel even better when the car is bigger than that of their friends, colleagues
or neighbors. Conversely, people may no longer be satisfied with their purchases if they
see others enjoying a more lavish lifestyle – and they may engage in further spending races
to try catch up (see, e.g., Dupor and Liu, 2003; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004).
As has been argued by several classical writers (e.g., Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949;
Leibenstein, 1950; Hirsch, 1976), and largely supported by the recent empirical status
consumption literature (see, e.g., Charles et al. 2009), social comparisons are not equally
important for all kinds of goods. For example, cars, jewelry, and electronic devices are
more useful for demonstrating wealth or economic power than health insurance, nutri-
tion or savings.2 Following Hirsch (1976), Frank (1985a) denotes the goods whose value
1The fraction of GDP devoted to “in-kind” spending ranges between 5 and 20 percentage in OECD
member states, and is still growing in many countries, both developed and developing (Currie and Gahvari,
2008).
2For further evidence, see, e.g., Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Heffetz (2011), Roth (2014).
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depends greatly on how they compare with the things owned by others as “positional
goods”; goods that are less dependent on such comparisons, he refers to as “non-positional
goods.”3 Irrespective of the underlying motive as to why humans may care about the rel-
ative amounts of certain items they posses (status signaling, evolutionary reasons, envy
etc.),4 social comparisons give rise to a market inefficiency that can be described as an
economic externality (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004): indi-
viduals trying to improve their relative position, adjust their budget shares toward the
positional goods, neglecting that their positional consumption imposes a harm onto others
(if one person consumes more of a positional good, another persons’ relative consumption
will ceteris paribus decline). As a consequence, they over[under] consume the positional
[non-positional] goods from a social point of view, calling for government intervention.
In this paper, we show that the public provision of private goods can serve as a policy
device to induce Pareto-improvements when individuals are concerned about their relative
position. In particular, by providing the by-and-large non-positional goods like health,
nutrition, and basic education, government may encourage the consumption of goods
that are underconsumed in the positional arms race and divert resources away from the
positional goods, thus having a quantity-based instrument to correct for the positional
externality. We identify the conditions on the nature of relative consumption preferences
such that public provision can always induce Pareto-improvements in a simple production-
exchange economy. We also demonstrate that Pareto-improvements can be achieved even
when a positional tax, an often proposed price instrument to deal with the inefficiency of
positional consumption, is available.
We present a model with two private goods and two types of individuals who differ in
their exogenous gross incomes (“rich” and “poor”). One good is positional, the other
non-positional. In addition to the absolute consumption of both goods, individuals care
about how their consumption of the positional good compares to an endogenous reference
level which they dislike being behind and enjoy being ahead of. Moreover, reference levels
may differ across income groups and are modeled as a general, weakly increasing function
of both groups’ average positional spending. This formulation allows us to distinguish
between the different types of social comparisons discussed in the social scientific liter-
ature, including upward, downward or within-group comparisons.5 We start to consider
3Other terms for a positional good are Veblen good, a conspicuous good or status good. We use the
term positional good, as it is neutral to the possible motives of why people have positional consumption
concerns. Important for our analysis is that individuals have interdependent utilities in the sense that
well-being is negatively affected by the consumption variables of others.
4For a discussion, see, e.g., Postlewaite (1998), Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), and Bilancini and
Boncinelli (2012).
5While earlier contributions focus on comparisons with the economy-wide average positional con-
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public provision of non-positional goods which is typically ascribed to health care, old-
age provision, nutrition and basic education (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Charles et al.
2009; Heffetz, 2011). In particular, the government may provide a uniform amount of the
non-positional good that is offered to all individuals free of charge and that can be topped
up by additional purchases on a market. To finance public provision, (lump-sum) income
taxes can be levied.
We find that public provision can always achieve Pareto-improvements over the laissez
faire if at least one income group compares its positional good consumption with that of
the poor – a condition satisfied by many specifications of reference functions such as av-
erage, within-group or downward comparisons. To get an intuition for this result, assume
that the government sets the public provision level slightly above the amount consumed
by the poor in the laissez faire, and raises income taxes by an equal amount. This policy
change does not alter the material utilities of both income types: as the rich had pur-
chased a larger amount of the non-positional good anyway, their consumption choice is
not affected; they take the publicly provided level and top it up through additional pur-
chases. The poor are forced to marginally reduce their spending on the positional and to
increase the consumption of the non-positional good, which – by the envelope theorem –
produces only negligible second-order effects. However, if at least one type of individuals
socially compares herself with the poor, the enforced reduction in positional spending of
the poor decreases (some) individuals’ reference levels, and thus, has positive first-order
welfare effects.
We extend our simple model into several directions. In our basic model, social comparisons
have an effect on only utility but not on consumption behavior. However, an individual’s
relative position may also affect her marginal propensity to consume. While the presence
of such peer effects in consumption considerably complicates the analysis and can give
rise to multiple equilibria, we derive a tractable sufficient condition for public provision
to be always Pareto-improving. This condition not only requires the existence of a social
type comparing herself to the poor, but also that people consume more of the positional
good if others’ consumption levels rise, a scenario that is labeled “keeping-up with the
Joneses” and considered the relevant case in the recent empirical literature on conspicuous
consumption (see, e.g., Kuhn et al., 2011; Roth, 2014).
When government can make use of a uniform tax on the positional good, we show that
there is a knife-edge preference scenario where public provision can never achieve a Pareto-
sumption (see, e.g., Abel, 1990; Clark and Oswald, 1998; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Dupor and Liu,
2003; Alonso-Carrera et al., 2004; Liu and Turnovsky, 2005), a growing body of work studies the pol-
icy implications of different comparison motives (see, e.g., Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner,
2013).
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improvement, namely whenever the social harms of positional consumption are the same
across types. In fact, there are scenarios (pure-within group comparisons of the poor), in
which public provision alone can achieve full Pareto-efficiency such that a positional tax
is redundant. Finally, we analyze the role of the public provision of the positional good,
which may apply for higher education. In this case, the government must be given a
stronger provision system in order to be able to induce Pareto-improvements: additional
private purchases of the positional good must be restrictable.
The relevance of our analysis is supported by the growing evidence suggesting that con-
cerns for relative standing play a crucial role in explaining individuals’ consumption pat-
terns. A robust finding in this literature is that the tendency for positional spending
seems to be particularly pronounced for lower income or status groups. For instance,
using US household consumption data, Charles et al. (2009) find that Blacks and His-
panics spend more on conspicuous goods (clothing, jewelry, cars) than do comparable
Whites. These expenditure differences are associated with substantial diversions of re-
sources from inconspicuous or non-positional goods such as education, health care and
food. Similar patterns hold for developing countries, where the poor devote relatively
large proportions of their incomes to lavish festivals, weddings or funerals (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2007; Case et al., 2008). Such behavior is often interpreted as satisfying needs
to signal a high relative standing (Moav and Neemann, 2010, 2012), and, in most cases,
financed by borrowing against the future (e.g., reduced old-age provision) or by diverting
resources away from basic education or health prevention like mosquito nets, preventive
drugs or basic vaccination (Brown et al., 2011; Khamis et al., 2012; Moav and Neemann,
2012). Our paper gives direct policy recommendation related to these findings. By pro-
viding non-positional goods (health care, basic education, etc.) with a simple top-up
system, the government can target the spending races of the poor separately, while leav-
ing the consumption choices of richer individuals unaffected – an objective that a uniform
consumption tax cannot achieve.
Our paper contributes to the general question on the role of status concerns for policy
design, which has recently emerged in the public economics literature. This literature
mainly focuses on price instruments (e.g., Frank, 1985; Ng, 1987; Corneo and Jeanne;
1997; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Micheletto, 2008; Truyts, 2012; Eckerstorfer and
Wendner, 2013) and income taxation (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Blomquist, 1993;
Ireland, 1998, 2001; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2010; Bilancini and Boncinelli,
2012). In contrast to these papers, we highlight in-kind spending and thus point to the
general usefulness of quantity instruments to cope with the market inefficiency related to
relative consumption concerns – a role that has been largely ignored in previous work.
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An important exception in this regard is Ireland (1994). Using a signaling framework,
he first develops the idea that public provision or in-kind spending is an instrument to
reduce people’s consumption of conspicuous goods. We go beyond this study by not just
emphasizing the behavioral consequences of public provision, but by also asking about
when these behavioral consequences translate into Pareto-improvements, thus conducting
a normative policy analysis (which he not does). Second, while Ireland uses quasi-linear
examples, our results apply for more general preferences, which enables us to trace the
role of social comparison direction for policy design. Finally, we provide a joint analysis
of consumption taxes and public provision.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework and
presents the economic problem. Section 2.2 illustrates the efficiency-enhancing potential of
public provision. Peer effects in consumption are considered in section 3. Section 4 studies
the case where consumption taxes are available. Section 5 analyzes whether Pareto-
efficient allocations can be attained. Section 6 considers the public provision of positional
goods, while the final section concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix 3.A.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Framework
General. Consider an economy populated by a large finite number of individuals. There
are two private goods c and x. Individuals can be of two types i = 1, 2 who differ in their
endowment income consisting of yi units of good x, where y1 < y2. We henceforth label
individuals of type 1 as “the poor” and of type 2 as “the rich.” The number of each type
is normalized to one. Good c is produced from good x by a competitive industry that
uses one unit of good x to produce one unit of good c.
Preferences. Individuals enjoy both goods per se, i.e., they derive utility from the abso-
lute consumption levels of these goods. In addition, they care about relative consumption,
i.e., about how their own level consumption compares to that of referent others. There is
evidence suggesting that relative consumption concerns are not equally important for all
kinds of goods (see, e.g., Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz, 2011). For simplicity, we assume
that one of the goods, good x, is entirely “non-positional”: for this good only absolute
consumption levels matter. In contrast, good c is a “positional good,” by which we mean
that both the absolute and relative consumption levels matter for individual well-being.
Specifically, preferences of income type i are represented by the utility function U i : R3 →
6
R with
U i(ci, xi,∆i) = u(ci, xi) + ∆i. (1)
In (1), u : R2+ → R, ui = u(ci, xi), is the utility from absolute consumption, which
is increasing in each argument, is twice continuously differentiable, and strictly quasi-
concave. The term ∆i represents i’s relative consumption, which we define as the difference
between her own level of consumption of good c and some reference level ri:6
∆i := ci − ri. (2)
We assume that type i’s reference level is endogenous in that it negatively depends on
the average amount of the positional good possessed by her own income group, c̄i, and
the average positional consumption of the respective other income group, c̄3−i:
ri := hi(c̄i, c̄j) for i 6= j.
As individuals with the same gross incomes are identical, ci will coincide with the average
consumption of group i in equilibrium. Thus, with a slight abuse of notation, we define ri
as a non-decreasing, twice continuously differentiable function hi : R2+ → Ki ⊂ R1, with
ri := hi(ci, cj),
∂hi
∂ci
≥ 0 and ∂h
i
∂cj
≥ 0 for i 6= j. (3)
We restrict the range of hi to Ki := {ri | 0 ≤ ri ≤ y1 + y2}, which means that reference
levels cannot exceed the economy’s aggregate resource endowment. In addition, for at least
one income type, either of the derivatives ∂hi/∂ci or ∂hi/∂cj must be strictly greater than
zero: if all reference levels were exogenous, a market inefficiency would not occur.
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we obtain
U i∗(c
i, xi, cj) := u(ci, xi) + ci − hi(ci, cj) for i 6= j, (4)
where U i∗ : R3+ → R. We assume that U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave and that relative
consumption concerns are not “too strong” in the sense that U i∗ strictly increases in c
i.
This means that if positional consumption is simultaneously increased for all members of
a given income group, the resulting negative social comparison effect can never outweigh
6We use this specific form of preferences to illustrate our main points as simply as possible. In
section 3, we study more general preferences.
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the positive material effect on individual well-being.7
Types of social comparisons. The general formulation of hi includes comparisons
with the average consumption of the entire economy c̄ := (c1 + c2) /2 as a special case. A
key feature of our formulation is, however, to allow different individuals to have different
reference levels, which captures ideas from social psychology that the notion of what
constitutes a “referent other” may considerably vary across social groups (Suls and Wills,
1991).
According to the similarity hypothesis, individuals are concerned about the consumption
levels of individuals who are similar to them, rather than about those who are socially
distant (see, e.g., Festinger, 1954; Runciman, 1966; Frank, 1984). In this case, an in-
dividual feels envious when another person has a bigger car, but only so if the other
person is a colleague, friend, family member or other social neighbor. In our framework
with two income types, we can represent such local comparisons by letting individuals’
reference levels be exclusively sensitive to the consumption of the members of their own
income group: ∂h1/∂c1 > 0, ∂h2/∂c2 > 0, and ∂h1/∂c2 = ∂h2/∂c1 = 0 (within-group
comparisons).
In contrast to this, Duesenberry (1949) suggests that people only care about the consump-
tion of individuals who are ranked socially higher: ∂h1/∂c2 > 0, ∂h1/∂c1 = ∂h2/∂c2 =
∂h2/∂c1 = 0 (upward comparisons). The opposite polar case is when individuals relate
to those below them in the income ranking: ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 and ∂h2/∂c2 = ∂h1/∂c1 =
∂h1/∂c2 = 0 (downward comparisons). This reference specification applies when peoples’
consumption choices reflect a desire to distance themselves from the poor (Bowles and
Park, 2005).8
Generally, there may be several reasons as to why individuals may care about their relative
consumption. To the extent that a favorable consumption position conveys a superior
position on some underlying status scale (such as wealth or income), relative consumption
preferences are compatible with a desire for a high social standing or status. Likewise, as
utility decreases the more others consume, our modeling also entails elements of jealousy,
envy or relative deprivation. As is common in the literature on relative consumption,
we assume that consumption variables of other individuals directly enter utility, without
presupposing one or another candidate motive. What is crucial for our analysis is the
7We thus avoid the “pervert” case that an allocation where everybody has zero amounts of the posi-
tional good c is Pareto-efficient. A similar assumption is made in Dupor and Liu (2003) and Dufwenberg
et al. (2011).
8As advocated by self-enhancement theory, individuals compare with others in order to make them-
selves feel better and they therefore tend to compare downward as a means to enhance self-esteem (Wood
and Taylor, 1991).
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hypothesis that an individual suffers utility losses when referent others’ consumption rise,
because her relative consumption declines.9
Individual maximization and equilibrium. When making consumption choices,
each individual treats her reference level as exogenous.10 Utility for a given reference level
is represented by the function Ũ : R3+ → R, with
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) := u(ci, xi) + ci − ri. (5)
We require Ũ to be strongly quasi-concave in xi and ci, i.e., given a reference level,
preferences over the positional and non-positional good are strictly convex. In addition,
let Ũ (ci, xi, ri) > Ũ (0, x̂i, ri) and Ũ (ci, xi, ri) > Ũ (ĉi, 0, ri) for all ri, ci > 0, xi > 0,
ĉi ≥ 0 and x̂i ≥ 0, which ensures strictly positive demands for both goods for all positive
incomes.
Denote the set of consumption bundles available to individual i by Bi ⊂ R2+. In all
scenarios we consider, this budget set will be compact and convex.11 The individual
maximization problem can be written as
max
ci,xi
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) s.t. (ci, xi) ∈ Bi. (6)
Since Ũ is strongly quasi-concave, problem (6) has a unique solution, defining type i’s
demands for goods c and x. By additive separability of Ũ , demands do not depend on
the reference level ri: social comparisons shift utility, without having any consequences
for behavior.12
In the course of the paper, we will repeatedly make use of i’s “ordinary” demand functions,
denoted by cid (I
i) and xid (I
i). By this we mean the solution of problem (6), when the
budget set takes the form Biu := {(ci, xi) : ci + xi ≤ I i}, where I i denotes disposable
income. Throughout the paper, we assume that both the positional and the non-positional
good are normal, i.e., ∂cid(I
i)/∂I i > 0 and ∂xid(I
i)/∂I i > 0.
We define an equilibrium as follows:
9For further discussion of the different motives compatible with relative consumption preferences, see,
e.g., Arrow and Dasgupta (2009); Heffetz and Frank (2011).
10This assumption is standard in the literature on relative consumption concerns and analogue to
price-taking behavior of atomistic individuals. Intuitively, as the number of individuals is large, they
regard their own contribution to the reference level as negligible. Since reference levels are a function of
the consumption of others, we could equivalently say that individuals take others’ consumption levels as
exogenously given.
11The general formulation of Bi simplifies the exposition as it allows us to express the definition of an
economic equilibrium as generally as possible and includes each policy scenario as a special case.
12This assumption is relaxed in section 3.
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Definition 1 An allocation C := (c1, x1, c2, x2) and a corresponding pair of reference
levels (r1, r2) constitute an equilibrium if




i + xi − yi) = 0,
(iii) for every i 6= j, ri = hi (ci, cj).
According to items (i) and (ii), an equilibrium allocation must maximize individuals’ util-
ity given their budgets and satisfy the economy’s resource constraint. Item (iii) requires
reference levels to be consistent with actual behavior (or, alternatively, requires individ-
uals to foresee others’ behavior correctly). With preferences as in (1) and (2), a unique
equilibrium always exists. When preferences are more general and reference levels do
affect behavior, multiple equilibria can emerge. We will study this case in section 3.
Inefficiency of the laissez-faire. In the following, we characterize the laissez-faire,
the benchmark of our model. Without state intervention, the individual budget set is







LF ) with c
i
LF := cd (y
i) and xiLF := xd (y
i). From the first-order conditions
of problem (6), CLF must satisfy
MRS(ci, xi) = 1 for i = 1, 2, (7)
where MRS (ci, xi) := (uic + 1)/u
i
x) is the marginal rate of substitution between goods c
and x, i.e., type i’s willingness to pay for the positional good measured in units of the
non-positional good.13
Denote the set of Pareto-efficient allocations by P . As shown in Appendix A.1, any








∗) ∈ P must satisfy














≥ 0 for i 6= j. (9)
The term Γi measures the aggregate willingness to pay to avoid an increase in reference
levels, induced by a marginal increase in ci. We will refer to Γi as the marginal “social
harm” of i’s positional good consumption. The left-hand side of (8) thus gives the aggre-
gate or willingness to pay for i’s consumption of the positional good. At a Pareto-efficient
13In the following, we abbreviate uic := ∂u(c
i, xi)/∂c and uix := ∂u(c
i, xi)/∂x.
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allocation, this expression must be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between
the two private goods, which is 1.
Under relative consumption preferences with endogenous reference levels, Γi is greater
than zero for at least one type. As a consequence, condition (7) does not coincide with
(8) for at least one i: CLF is Pareto-inefficient. Intuitively, individuals neglect that
their consumption of the positional good increases others’ reference levels in their private
optimization, such that there is divergence between the private and the social evaluation
of the positional good.
In addition, all individuals for whom Γi is non-zero overconsume [underconsume] the
positional [non-positional good] in the laissez-faire: by (7), the aggregate willingness to
pay for ci equals 1 − Γi at CLF , and thus falls short of the social cost. Since the utility
function U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave, there always exists a consumption bundle containing
a slightly lower [higher] level of ci [xi] that is Pareto-superior to (ciLF , x
i
LF ).
In the course of the paper, we will assume that for any element in P , c1∗ < c2∗ and x1∗ < x2∗.14
2.2 The efficiency role of public provision
Many goods and services that governments provide play a subordinate role for social
comparisons. For example, health care and old-age savings have relatively little effect
on gaining high social status compared to smartphones, clothes and cars (see Alpizar et
al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz, 2011). We now
lay out the basic argument for why publicly providing non-positional goods can achieve
Pareto-improvements over the laissez-faire.
Consider a simple provision scheme, where the government may provide a uniform level g
of the non-positional good, which is offered to all individuals free of charge and which can
be topped up with private purchases, but not resold in the market (xi ≥ g).15 To finance
public provision, the government has access to non-linear income taxes T i := T (yi). We
denote type i’s income after taxes by bi := yi − T i. It will be convenient to use bi as a
government choice variable, rather than T i itself. We call P = (b1, b2, g) ∈ R3+ a policy,
which is a vector assigning the uniform provision level and a net income to each individual.
Any policy must be feasible in the sense that it balances the government budget:
G := y1 − b1 + y2 − b2 − 2g = 0. (10)
We restrict the set of available policies to those where b2 > b1. We further require bi > 0
14The assumption serves to simplify the exposition and is not essential for any of our results.
15If individuals can resell the amounts of the non-positional good they receive from the government,
public provision would be equivalent to a cash transfer.
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for i = 1, 2, i.e., that income taxation is not exhaustive.
Individual behavior under public provision. For a given policy, individuals decide
how to allocate their net income on market purchases of the two private goods. Formally,
each individual solves (6), given her budget
Big :=
{
(ci, xi) : ci + xi − g ≤ bi, xi ≥ g
}
.
The unique solution to this problem must satisfy











i + g) if g < xd (b
i + g) ,





i + g) if g < xd (b
i + g) ,
g if g ≥ xd (bi + g) ,
(13)
where cd(·) and xd(·) are the “ordinary” or “unconstrained” demand functions.17 Observe
that xd (b
i + g) gives the amount of the non-positional good that an individual with income
bi would buy if she received g in cash. If governments provides a lower amount of the non-
positional good than this critical level (g < xd (b
i + g)), public provision is equivalent to
a cash transfer: the individual takes the publicly provided good and purchases additional
units of the non-positional good in the market so that her total consumption of good
x equals xd (b
i + g). If, in contrast, the provision level is large enough such that the
individual would buy less than the publicly provided amount (g ≥ xd (bi + g)), she reduces
her private purchases of the non-positional to zero and spends her entire net income on
the positional good. We say that the individual is “crowded out.” As good x is normal,
the poor are crowded out at a lower level of public provision than the rich.18
16The formal derivation of the demand functions is equivalent to Epple and Romano (1996b) and
therefore omitted.





One-sided differentiability is sufficient for our proofs to follow.
18It might be that crowding out levels do not exist. Crucial for our analysis will be that type i does
reduce her private purchases to zero when faced with a policy where g = T i.
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Let
V i(bi, bj, g) :=ui(ci(bi, g), xi(bi, g)) + ci(bi, g)− hi(ci(bi, g), cj(bj, g)) (14)
be the equilibrium indirect utility of type i. Generally, from the definition of hi, V i also
depends on the net income of the respective other type. Indirect utilities are continuous
and are one-sided differentiable at points where g = xd (b
i + g).
Conditions for public provision to be Pareto-improving. Our first proposition
establishes that, under relatively mild assumptions on the reference functions hi, public
provision of the non-positional good can always achieve Pareto-improvements over the
laissez-faire:
Proposition 1 If ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 for all c1 and c2, there exists a policy
P = (b1, b2, g) with g > 0 that achieves a Pareto-improvement over the laissez-faire.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Consider a policy scheme where any public
provision level is financed by an equal-sized reduction in both types’ net incomes, bi = yi−
g. Under this scheme, an individual is crowded out by public provision if g ≥ xd (bi + g) =
xd (y
i) = xiLF . By demand functions (12) and (13), setting the public provision level equal
to g = x1LF then leads to the same consumption allocation – and hence, utilities levels –
as in the laissez-faire. For this policy, the poor are “just” constrained by public provision
and spend their entire net income on the positional good, whereas public provision is
cash-equivalent for the rich.
Now, consider a marginal increase in the provision level slightly above x1LF . This policy
change would have no effect on both types’ utilities if reference levels were constant. By the
continuity of individual demand functions, the rich still consume the same consumption
bundle as in the laissez-faire. The poor, in contrast, are forced to consume slightly more
of the non-positional good and less of the positional good, which has a negative effect on
u (c1, x1) + c1. But, as the poor are in their private optimum at g = x1LF , this effect is of
second-order and therefore negligible. However, if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0, the forced
reduction in c1 has a positive first-order welfare effect, as it then lowers the reference
level of at least one income group. Since the proposed policy changes are always feasible,
∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 is sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-improving policy
with g > 0, as stated in the proposition.
According to Proposition 1, public provision is always desirable from an efficiency per-
spective if the reference level of at least one type depends on the positional consumption
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of the poor. This dependence is a rather weak assumption about the nature of rela-
tive preferences: no information about the strength of relative consumption concerns is
needed; the mere existence of consumption comparisons can suffice for public provision
to be Pareto-improving.
One scenario where the condition in Proposition 1 is fulfilled is when there is social
competition among the poor, i.e., when the poor engage in conspicuous consumption (at
least partly) to impress the other poor (∂h1/∂c1 6= 0). The recently growing empirical
literature on status consumption provides evidence that, in many countries (including
developing ones), the poor devote a relatively large share of their income to positional
spending items, suggesting that relative consumption concerns are indeed relevant for
this income class (Charles et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2011; Heffetz, 2011). Taken together
with evidence that social comparisons are particularly strong among own social class
members (individuals compare themselves with their immediate social peers, see, e.g.,
Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Kuhn et al. 2011; Roth, 2014), this suggests
that ∂h1/∂c1 6= 0 is likely to hold for many societies. In these cases, forcing the poor to
slightly overconsume the non-positional good through public provision is always desirable
from an efficiency perspective.19
Another scenario where the condition in Proposition 1 holds is when individuals (to what-
ever small extent) are downward-oriented, i.e., when individuals try to socially separate
from the poor. Evidence for the existence of downward comparisons is provided in Falk
and Knell (2004). In these cases, the rich would benefit from crowding out the poor,
without presuming paternalism.
The condition provided in Proposition 1 is sufficient, but is not necessary for the existence
of Pareto-improving public provision. To see this, let the provision scheme again be given
by bi = yi−g. Further suppose that the poor are purely upward-looking and that the rich
are entirely in-group-oriented. Then, providing the non-positional good in the interval
g ∈ (x1LF , x2LF ] only has negative efficiency effects: public provision distorts the poor away
from their preferred consumption bundle without affecting people’s reference levels. But
if the provision level is set slightly above x2LF , it forces the rich to reduce their positional
consumption – which ceteris paribus has positive welfare effects since ∂h1/∂c2 > 0 and
∂h2/∂c2 > 0. If this effect is strong enough, a Pareto-improvement may occur for some
g > x2LF . In the following example, we demonstrate that this can indeed happen:
Example 1: Assume that material utility is Cobb-Douglas with u (ci, xi) = cixi. Indi-
viduals then maximize Ũ (ci, xi, ri) = cixi + ci − ri. Further assume (pure) upward com-
19Notice that in our model such a policy is in the very self-interest of the poor; there is no paternalism
of the rich.
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parisons of the poor and (pure) within-group comparisons of the rich, i.e., h1 (c1, c2) =
h2 (c2, c1) = c2. Set the parameters of the model to y1 = 10, and y2 = 10.4. In this








LF ) = (5.5, 4.5, 5.75, 4.75).
Now, introducing public provision with g = 5 and T 1 = T 2 = 5 yields (c1, x1, c2, x2) =
(5, 5, 5.4, 5) as the equilibrium consumption allocation. The resulting utility differential is
V 1 (5, 5.4, 5) − V 1 (10, 10.4, 0) = 0.05 > 0 and V 2 (5, 5.4, 5) − V 2 (10, 10.4, 0) = 0.21 > 0,
i.e., public provision makes both types strictly better off.
We considered a simple provision system where all individuals receive a uniform amount
of the non-positional good. Since the poor are first crowded out by public provision,
the government can correct the externality of their positional spending without causing
any negative efficiency effects for the rich. As Example 1 shows, this does not hold vice
versa; when the public provision level is uniform, reducing the positional spending of the
rich necessarily distorts the consumption choices of the poor. If we allowed for income-
dependent provision levels, the case for public provision would be even stronger: the
government could then separately target each individual’s social harm and always achieve
Pareto-improvements for any type of relative consumption preferences. The appeal of our
analysis is that we provide sufficient conditions when public provision is Pareto-improving
under a weak public provision mechanism.
3 Peer effects
In our basic model, social comparisons have well-being effects alone: reference levels
enter utility without having any effect on consumption behavior. While this modeling is
consistent with a large body of research showing that a favorable social rank positively
correlates with measures of life satisfaction (see, e.g., Luttmer, 2005, and the references
cited therein), the recent empirical conspicuous consumption literature provides evidence
suggesting that an individual’s relative position may also affect her marginal propensity
to consume. In this section, we therefore allow reference levels to reflect in behavior.
Preferences and behavior. Let the preferences of individual i be represented by a
strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable function U : R3 → R, where
U i := U(ci, xi,∆i). (15)
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Unlike in section 2, preferences no longer need to be separable in relative consumption:
Uc∆, Ux∆ ≥ 0. In addition, ∆i is a general function ∆i : R2+ → R, with







Reference levels continue to be given by (3).20
Substituting (16) into (15) gives utility for constant reference levels:
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) := U(ci, xi,∆(ci, ri)). (17)
As in the previous section, we assume that Ũ i is strongly quasi-concave in ci and xi and
that its level curves do not intersect the axis in the c/x plane.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we suppose that government is restricted to
a public provision scheme where T 1 = T 2 = g, rendering the policy space one-dimensional.
Given g and ri, individuals maximize (17) subject to (ci, xi) ∈ B̃g, with
B̃ig :=
{
(ci, xi) : ci + xi ≤ yi, xi ≥ g
}
.




i, ri) if g < xid (y
i, ri) ,





i, ri) if g < xid (y
i, ri) ,
g if g ≥ xid (yi, ri) .
(19)
The crucial difference to the previous chapter is that an individuals’ demands now de-
pend on her reference level when not being crowded out. In this case, the comparative
statics of ci with respect to ri are generally unclear in sign and depend on how the
marginal rate of substitution between the positional and non-positional good, MRS :=
Ũ ic(c
i, xi, ri)/Ũ ix(c
i, xi, ri), varies with ri.21 We consider two polar cases: one where the
MRS is globally increasing and one where it is globally decreasing in the reference level
20Notice that in addition to difference comparisons used so far (∆i = ci−ri), our general formulation of
preferences also allows for ratio-comparisons, where relative consumption is given by (or some monotone
transformation of) ∆i(ci, ri) = ci/ri. Ratio comparisons have been used in, e.g., Clark and Oswald
(1998).
21Whenever an individual is crowded out, the reference level has no effect on consumption as in our
basic model, i.e., ∂ci/∂ri = 0 and ∂xi/∂ri = 0.
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for each type. In Appendix A.3, we show that
∂MRS (ci, xi, ri)
∂ri





Hence, with an increasing MRS, an individual who experiences an increase in the posi-
tional consumption of persons she compares herself to will respond by increasing her own
positional consumption, too. Following Dupor and Liu (2003), we say that preferences ex-
hibit “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ). In the reverse case, whereMRS (ci, xi, ri) /∂ri <
0, an individual responds by cutting back her positional consumption whenever that of
her referent others increases (∂cid/∂r
i < 0); we say that preferences exhibit “running away
from the Joneses” (RAJ).
Equilibria. Again, an equilibrium is defined as a consumption allocation and pair of
reference levels that satisfy the conditions in Definition 1. When preferences are separable
in ri, there exists a unique equilibrium for a given policy. With non-separable preferences
as in (15), multiple equilibria can occur. To see this, note that condition (iii) of Definition 1
requires consistency of reference levels and actual behavior, i.e.,
r1 − h1(c1(g, r1), c2(g, r2)) = 0,
r2 − h2(c2(g, r2), c1(g, r1)) = 0.
(20)
For every g, system (20) is a fixed-point equation in R2. By applying Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem, there exists a pair of reference levels (r̂1, r̂2) that solves (20).22 However,
as demands for the positional good depend on ri, several pairs of reference levels may
satisfy (20). Since each reference level pair corresponds to a unique allocation, multiple
equilibrium allocations can emerge. Given a public provision level, we collect the solutions
to (20) in the set Eg.
In the following, we make an assumption that ensures equilibria to be at least locally
unique – in the sense that for every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ Eg, there is no other reference pair solving
(20) sufficiently close to it (see Appendix A.3). The assumption also guarantees that
ordinary demands cid and x
i
d remain normal in the presence of peer effects. Specifically,
we impose:
22To see this, rewrite (20) as r = (r1, r2)′ = h(r), where h : R2 → R2 is given by h(r) := (h̃1, h̃2)′
with h̃i(r1, r2) := hi(ci(g, ri), cj(g, rj)). Since demand functions are continuous in ri, h is a continuous
function mapping each point (r1, r2) of the convex and compact set K1 × K2 ∈ R2 into itself, which
ensures the existence of a (r̂1, r̂2) that solves (20) for any g.
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> 0 for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 1 allows us to apply an implicit function theorem for non-differentiable map-
pings such that we can express any solution to (20) as a function of the public provision
level, r̂(g) = (r̂1(g), r̂2(g)).23 For every g, we can therefore write individual i’s indirect
utility as
V i(g) = ui(ci(g, r̂i(g)), xi(g, r̂i(g)),∆i(ci(g, r̂i(g)), r̂i(g))). (21)
Denote the set of equilibrium reference levels in the laissez-faire (g = 0) by ELF . Again,
individuals overconsume the positional and underconsume the non-positional good at
every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF . The reason is that, irrespective of whether preferences satisfy KUJ
or RAJ, the source of inefficiency is not removed by social peer effects: individuals still
neglect that their own amount of the positional good negatively affects the well-being of
others.
In what follows, we assume that the rich consume more of both goods than the poor in
any laissez-faire equilibrium.24 Furthermore, the government can select between different
laissez-faire equilibria in the sense that, for a given (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF , reference levels remain
constant whenever the public provision level is set equal to g = x1LF . This ensures that
any given laissez-faire equilibrium can be replicated by public provision.
Sufficient condition. The following proposition identifies when public provision can
always induce Pareto-improvements in the presence of peer effects:
Proposition 2 For every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF , there exists a Pareto-improving policy with
g > 0 if
(i) ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 for all c1 and c2.
(ii) preferences exhibit KUJ (∂cid/∂r
i > 0.
According to Proposition 2, the existence of (at least) one income type who feels in social
competition with the poor is no longer sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-improving
23See Appendix A.3.
24As the ordinary demands are normal, this is generally satisfied if both types have the same reference
level. However, as we allow reference levels to vary across types, it may happen that the rich have a lower
demand for one of the two goods. For simplicity, we exclude such cases.
18
provision scheme: preferences must also satisfy KUJ (positional consumption choices are
strategic complements). The logic behind this result is as follows. When the government
sets the provision level slightly above a given x1LF , the poor are forced to slightly reduce
their positional spending to the advantage of the non-positional good, which, as in the
basic model, ceteris paribus has strictly positive welfare effects whenever ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or
∂h2/∂c1 > 0. However, the lower positional consumption of the poor may now evoke a






preferences exhibit RAJ (∂cid/∂r
i < 0) and ∂h2/∂c1 6= 0, the rich will react to the decrease
in c1 with an increase of their positional spending, which ceteris paribus exerts an upward
pressure on reference levels. If this effect is strong enough, forcing the poor away from
the positional good will increase reference levels in equilibrium and lower indirect utilities
such that publicly providing the non-positional good is harmful.
This is different under KUJ, ∂cid/∂r
i > 0, where c1 and c2 tend to move in the same
direction. Then, crowding out the positional consumption of the poor will also reduce the
positional consumption of the rich and will thus reinforce the initial positive welfare effect.
Therefore, under KUJ, setting the provision level slightly above x1LF will unambiguously
provide a Pareto-improvement, as long as somebody compares herself with the poor.
Evidence of positive interaction effects can be found in the social networks literature,
which reports of conformity or bandwagon effects for various social contexts, including
risky behavior, recreational activities or labor supply decisions (for a survey, see Durlauf
and Ioannides, 2010). Recently, positive peer effects have also been confirmed for po-
sitional consumption choices. For instance, Kuhn et al. (2011) show that neighbors of
lottery winners (who received cash and a new BMW) increase spending on cars and ex-
terior home renovation. Similarly, analyzing data from a randomized conditional cash
transfer program in Indonesia, Roth (2014) finds that the expenditure share of visible
goods rises for (untreated) households whose reference group’s visible consumption is ex-
ogenously increased. In fact, we are not aware of any paper that reports of negative
correlations between peer decision variables – neither in the conspicuous consumption,
nor in the broader social network literature. We therefore argue that condition (ii) of
Proposition 2 is likely to hold such that, if anything, peer effects are likely to reinforce the
effectiveness of public provision to correct consumers’ distortions related to the concern
for relative consumption.
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4 Taxation of the positional good
In this chapter, we study the case where taxation of the positional good is possible. For
simplicity, we will abstract from peer effects in consumption and return to the basic model
of section 2.
We assume that government can make use of linear or uniform commodity taxation, where
every income type faces the same tax rate per unit of positional spending. We make this
assumption since personalized consumption taxation is difficult to implement in practice.
For instance, this would mean that every customer can be charged with a different price
at the cash register or that government can directly observe the identity of the purchaser
(i.e., who consumes how much of a given good), which is administratively and/or polit-
ically infeasible (see, e.g., Diamond, 1973; Sandmo, 1975; Green and Sheshinski, 1976;
Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013).
4.1 Available policies and benchmark situation
In addition to income taxation and uniform public provision, the government can now
levy a uniform per unit tax t on good c. Each individual then faces a consumer price of
p(t) = 1 + t. A policy is described by the vector P = (b1, b2, g, t). Again, policy must be
feasible and should balance the government budget:
G := y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2 − 2g = 0. (22)
The individual budget set is given by
Bit =
{
(ci, xi) : (1 + t)ci + xi ≤ bi + g, xi ≥ g
}
. (23)
Preferences are the same as in the basic model and are described by (1) to (3).
To see whether there is a case for public provision when a positional tax is available, we
proceed as follows. We start from a situation where the government can make use of the
positional tax and lump-sum income taxes only and sets these instruments optimally, in
the sense that no further Pareto-improvements can be achieved, given a minimum utility
requirement for one income type. We then analyze whether allowing for positive levels
of public provision can induce a Pareto-improvement over this situation, the optimal
positional tax solution.
The policy problem in the absence of public provision can be stated so as to find the policy
(b1, b2, g, t) that maximizes the indirect utility of the poor, V 1(b1, b2, g, p(t)), given that
the indirect utility of the rich V 2(b2, b1, g, p(t)) does not fall below a minimum level Ū2,
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the government budget is balanced, and g = 0. Solving this problem for varying levels of
Ū2 gives the set of optimal tax policies S. We assume that there exists a unique interior




0, 0, t0) and the corresponding








0). We restrict S to policies where b2 > b1 such
that type 2 is also richer than type 1 in terms of net income. In Appendix A.4, we show
that for any P0 ∈ S, the optimal tax on the positional good can be (implicitly) written
as a weighted average of both groups’ social harms of positional consumption
t0 = [αΓ
1 + (1− α)Γ2] > 0, (24)
where the weights α ∈ (0, 1) and (1−α) ∈ (0, 1) are defined in Appendix A.4. This formula
is familiar from the recent literature on positional externalities and their implications
for optimal commodity taxation (see, e.g., Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner,
2013).
4.2 When public provision can achieve Pareto-improvements
If the optimal positional tax suffices to implement Pareto-efficient allocations, public
provision – or any other policy instrument – would be redundant. The next proposition
identifies when this is the case:
Proposition 3 An optimal positional tax P0 ∈ S induces a Pareto-efficient allocation
C∗ ∈ P if and only if Γ1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0.
When both income groups impose identical marginal social harms, a uniform tax on
the positional good – combined with appropriate income taxes – is sufficient to restore
efficiency: as individuals choose both goods according to MRS(ci, xi) = 1 + t, a tax of
t = Γ1 = Γ2 implies MRS(ci, xi) − Γi = 1, which coincides with the efficiency condition
(8). Conversely, if Γ1 6= Γ2, both income groups exert different marginal externalities,
and uniform consumption taxes can never implement efficient allocations. In such cases,
public provision as an additional policy instrument can be valuable.
The question is, which types of social comparisons imply identical social harms? Using





















It is straightforward to check that condition (25) holds if every individual compares her
own consumption with the economy’s average c̄. More generally, there is no role for
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public provision if, for both income types, the identity of the individual who purchases
the positional good is irrelevant, i.e., if ∂hi/∂ci = ∂hi/∂cj for all i 6= j. In this case, it
would be immaterial to an individual whether it is her neighbor who buys a new car or
a socially more distant member of society. However, recent empirical evidence suggests
that social distance does matter for social comparison: individuals are more concerned
about the possessions of others if these others are members of their own social class or
if they are individuals they have direct social interaction with (for evidence of the local
comparison hypothesis, see, e.g., Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Roth, 2014.)
In fact, most of the examples we discussed in section 2 imply different marginal social
harms. This clearly holds for pure upward and downward comparisons (where one of Γ1
or Γ2 is equal to zero), but is generally also true for pure within-group comparisons and
all intermediate types with ∂hi/∂ci 6= ∂hi/∂cj.25 Hence, in general, there is room for the
public provision of private goods even if an optimal uniform tax on the positional good
is in place.
The next proposition demonstrates that if the poor impose the larger social harm than
the rich, public provision of the non-positional good can always be Pareto-improving
compared to policies P0:
Proposition 4 For every P0 ∈ S, if Γ1|C=C0 > Γ
2|C=C0, there exists a policy P with
g > 0 which is Pareto-superior to P0.
To get an intuition for Proposition 4, consider a policy P0 ∈ S and the corresponding
allocation C0. By setting the public provision level slightly above x
1
0 and lowering the
net income of each type by an equal-valued amount, the government can force the poor
to reduce their positional spending, which has a social benefit given by Γ1. In contrast
to the case without consumption taxes, however, an additional effect emerges: the lower
positional consumption of the poor creates a tax revenue loss equal to t0. If the marginal
benefit from crowding out the poor outweighs the revenue loss (i.e., if Γ1 > t0), one can
always find a feasible policy that induces a Pareto-improvement over P0. Using formula
(24) for the optimal tax t0, the requirement Γ
1 > t0 is equivalent to Γ
1 > Γ2 – the
condition stated in Proposition 4.





















25An positional externality with ∂hi/∂ci 6= ∂hi/∂cj for at least one i is sometimes called non-
atmospheric. The implications of non-atmospheric externalities for the theory of optimal commodity
taxation have recently been studied in, e.g., Micheletto (2008) and Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013).
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As opposed to the case where positional good consumption cannot be taxed, condition
(26) involves information on the relative strength of ∂hi/∂ci and ∂hi/∂cj. In particular,
public provision is always desirable when richer individuals have sufficiently strong needs
to separate themselves from the poor or when the poor are sufficiently concerned with the
consumption levels of the other poor (ceteris paribus, ∂h2/∂c1 or ∂h1/∂c1 must be large
enough).26
Public provision of non-positional goods might be desirable even if Γ2 > Γ1. We demon-
strate this in a numerical example in Appendix A.7, where we assume pure upward com-
parisons of the poor. As in the case without consumption taxes, public provision then
needs to constrain both the rich and the poor. In sum, for a wide range of social com-
parison types, public provision can achieve Pareto-improvements even if governments can
implement optimal uniform taxes on the positional good.
5 Implementation of Pareto-efficient allocations
As shown in previous sections, public provision can be a valuable instrument to attain
Pareto-improvements in the presence of relative consumption concerns. We derived our
results under mild assumptions on the type of the public provision system: the provision
level was uniform and individuals were allowed to purchase additional units of the non-
positional good on the market. In this section, we ask whether such a weak provision
scheme can also implement Pareto-efficient allocations. We abstract from peer effects and
study the cases with and without a consumption tax separately. When the government has
access to a positional tax, we only consider scenarios where Γ1 6= Γ2, as public provision
is redundant otherwise.
Proposition 5 For any C∗ ∈ P,
(i) if a tax on the positional good is not available, there exists a policy P = (b1, b2, g)
with g > 0 that implements C∗ if and only if ∂h
1/∂c2 = ∂h2/∂c2 = 0.
(ii) if a tax on the positional good is available, there exists a policy P = (b1, b2, g, t) with
g > 0 that implements C∗ if and only if Γ
1|C=C∗ > Γ
2|C=C∗. This policy entails
g = x1∗ and t = Γ
2|C=C∗.
Item (i) of Proposition 5 shows that there are preference scenarios where public provision
alone can support efficient allocations, namely whenever ∂h1/∂c2 = ∂h2/∂c2 = 0. The
26Condition (26) globally holds in the polar cases of pure downward comparisons of the rich or pure
within-group comparisons of the poor.
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intuition is that when reference levels do not depend on c2, the rich do not exert a
positional externality (Γ2 is globally zero) such that one needs to correct the consumption
choices of the poor only. With our simple public provision system this is possible: as both
goods are normal and individuals are allowed to top up, by setting the provision level to
g = x1∗ and reducing gross incomes by an equal-valued amount, the government can force
the poor to choose the first-best bundle (c1∗, x
1
∗), without constraining the rich.
Preference settings that fulfill the condition of item (i) are pure within-group comparisons
of the poor or pure downward comparisons of the rich. Observe that a linear positional tax
alone can never achieve the first-best in such cases. The reason is that a uniform positional
tax reduces the incentive to consume the positional good for every income type; it does
not allow for targeting the poor separately. Hence, there are preference scenarios where
public provision strictly dominates a price instrument and where positional externalities
are better addressed by publicly providing health care or basic education, but not taxing
positional goods like smartphones, cars or jewelry.
If we allow for a consumption tax as an additional instrument, Pareto-efficient allocations
can be achieved even if Γ2 > 0. As stated in item (ii) of Proposition 5, this requires
a sufficiently strong social harm of the poor in the sense that Γ1 > Γ2, evaluated at
the first-best. To get an intuition, assume for a moment that public provision is not
feasible. Government can induce the rich to choose her first-best bundle by setting the
positional tax to t = Γ2 and adjusting income taxes appropriately. If Γ1 > Γ2, the poor
will overconsume [underconsume] the positional [non-positional] good at this policy, as
the tax rate required to fully internalize their externality must be higher (this required
a tax rate of t = Γ1). The poor’s consumption bundle can, however, be adjusted to
the first-best by introducing public provision and setting the provision level equal to
g = x1∗. If, in contrast, the poor impose a smaller social harm than the rich (Γ
1 < Γ2),
the poor underconsume the positional good at the externality-internalizing tax rate of
the rich, which would call for a reduction of x1. This, however, cannot be achieved by
providing the non-positional good with a top-up system. Therefore, when a positional
tax is available, Γ1 > Γ2 is both sufficient and necessary to decentralize a given first-best
allocation.
When Γ2 > Γ1, we need stronger public provision systems. One possibility would be
to allow for income-dependent public provision. Any efficient allocation could then be
directly implemented by setting the provision levels equal to x1∗ and x
2
∗. However, income-
specific provision might be infeasible due to high administrative costs or political economy
considerations. Alternatively, governments could keep with uniform provision, but restrict
additional purchases of the non-positional good in the market. Individuals would then face
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a choice between accepting the publicly provided level or opting out of the public system
and purchasing the non-positional good entirely in the market. Educational services are
often available via such a “dual” provision system, where parents can send their children
to either a public or a private school (but not both). With public provision of this type,
Pareto-efficient allocations are attainable even if the marginal social harm is stronger
among the rich. This requires, however, the poor [the rich] to indeed stay in [out of] the
public system at policies with g = x1∗ and t = Γ
2.
6 Public provision of the positional good
In the previous sections, the publicly provided good was non-positional. In line with em-
pirical evidence, this characteristic can be reasonably attributed to goods like health care,
health insurance or old-age savings. The case of education is perhaps less clear-cut, even
though the overwhelming majority of studies in the empirical literature on conspicuous
consumption classifies spending on education as non-positional (see, e.g., Charles et al.,
2009; Heffetz, 2011; Khamis et al., 2012; Friehe and Mechtel, 2014).27 For instance, Frank
(1985) argues that education expenditure (e.g., tuition fees for private schools) may serve
as a conspicuous signal to demonstrate wealth, and that it is precisely this positional
aspect of education that may justify government intervention in the educational sector in
the form of providing public schools.
Generally, what makes a good positional good may depend on the social and cultural
environment. In this section, we analyze the public provision of positional goods, which
may apply for higher education. We identify a condition when publicly providing the
positional good can always produce Pareto-improvements. This condition can be related
to social comparisons direction and income inequality.28
Framework. Preferences are as in section 2. Let the uniform provision level of the
positional good be denoted by e. As individuals tend to overconsume the positional good
in the laissez-faire, the consumption of good c must be distorted downwards. But this is
impossible with a top-up provision: whenever the government provided a lower amount
of the positional good than an individual demands for a given net income, the individual
would purchase additional units in the market until she reaches her desired quantity.
27The only exception in this literature is Roth (2014). In his study using Indonesian household survey
data, education is placed second on a visibility ranking scale, and is thus considered a positional good.
28Our analysis can be seen as a formalization of Frank’s arguments. Interestingly, though Frank
(1985a) advocates taxes on other luxury items such as yachts and jewelry, he does not suggest this price
instrument to regulate overspending in education, maybe since this involves the contra-intuitive result
that education should be taxed rather than subsidized.
25
Public provision of the positional good must therefore be through an opt-out system,
where individuals must decide whether to accept the publicly provided level e or to buy
the positional good entirely in the market. The government furthermore has access to
income taxes T i = T (yi) such that net income is given by bi = yi − T i.
The chronology of events is as follows. In the first stage, the government specifies a policy
P = (b1, b2, e). In the second stage, individuals decide whether or not to stay in the public
system. In the third stage, individuals spend their net incomes to maximize utility. We
assume that in stages 2 and 3, individuals take their reference levels as exogenously given.
Solving the model backwards, consider first stage 3. If an individual stays in the public
system for a given policy, she consumes e units of good c and spends her entire net income
on the non-positional good. Hence, her utility is given by V iin := u(e, b
i) + e − ri. If an
individual opts out of the public system, she chooses (ci, xi) as to maximize u(ci, xi)+ci−ri
subject to ci + xi = bi. The solution to this problem gives the demand functions cd(b
i)
and xd(b
i), which – as opposed to the top-up case – do not depend on the provision level




In the second stage, an individual stays in the public system if V iin ≥ V iout, defining a
cut-off rule. It can be shown that for every net income, there is a unique provision level êi
such that individual i stays in (opts out of) the public system if e ≥ (<) êi.29 The critical
level ê(bi) is determined by
u(êi, bi) + êi − ri = u(cd(bi), xd(bi)) + cd(bi)− ri. (27)
Intuitively, ê is the minimum provision level that individual i must be given in order to
prevent her from consuming the positional good in the market. This level is lower than
the amount of the positional good an individual would like to buy for a given net income,
i.e., êi < cd(b
i). The reason is that public provision is provided free of charge; therefore,
an individual is willing to accept a discount on her desired amount of the positional
good when attracted by the public system. Due to this feature of opt-out provision,
government may induce individuals to reduce their positional consumption in favor of the
non-positional good. Second, as demands are normal, the critical level ê is increasing in
net income, so that the government has some scope to target different types differently.30
29To see this, note that at e = 0, V iout > V
i
in by the assumption that both goods are essential. This
inequality is reversed when e is sufficiently large: if e is set equal to cd(b





the continuity of V iout and V
i
in, ê
i exists. Since V iout is independent of e while V
i
in strictly increases, ê
i is
unique.
30This is seen by implicitly differentiating (27) with respect to bi and using the fact that, along
an indifference curve, the marginal utility of good c is declining when both goods are normal (for a
detailed proof in the case without relative consumption, which applies here as well as when preferences
are separable, see Epple and Romano, 1996a).
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Denote the number of individuals who choose public provision by N ∈ [0, 2]. As unique
critical levels êi exist, N is uniquely determined for every given policy, and we can write
it as a function of policy variables, i.e., N = N(b1, b2, e). We define an equilibrium of the
economy as follows:
Definition 2 An allocation C = (c1, c2, x1, x2), a corresponding pair of reference levels
(r1, r2) and a policy P = (b1, b2, e) constitute an equilibrium if
(i) for every i, (ci, xi) solves the individual maximization problems at stages 2 and 3




i + ci − yi) = 0,
(iii) for every i 6= j, ri = hi(ci, cj),
(iv) y1 − b1 + c1 + y2 − b2 + c2 −N(b1, b2, e) e = 0.
A sufficient condition.
Proposition 6 There always exist a Pareto-improving policy with e > 0 if
(i) ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 and
(ii) c1LF < ê
2(y2).
The logic behind Proposition 6 is as follows. Consider a policy regime where the provision
level is set to the amount of the positional good which the poor consume in the laissez-
faire. In addition, the poor’s income is reduced by an equal amount and the rich remain
untaxed. Under this policy, the poor receive the same consumption bundle as in the
laissez-faire, with the difference being that they now obtain the positional good from the
public system. If then the government marginally reduces the provision level and, at the
same time, decreases the income tax for the poor, the poor will adjust their consumption
bundle toward the non-positional good. This policy shift yields a Pareto-improvement,
provided that the poor’s consumption matters to someone (condition (i)) and the rich are
not attracted by the public system. The latter is ensured if the rich stay out of public
provision at the initial provision level, i.e., c1LF (y
1) < ê2(y2) (condition (ii)).
Condition (ii) of Proposition 6 cannot be directly linked to relative consumption concerns,
as the decision as to whether or not to stay in the public system depends on the total
utility differential V iin − V iout, and hence, on absolute consumption utility terms as well.
Nevertheless, it provides insights when the public provision of the positional good is
particularly useful. Both c1LF (y
1) and ê2(y2) are increasing functions of income. Hence,
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condition (ii) will hold if the income differential y2 − y1 is sufficiently large, which can
be interpreted as a measure of income inequality. As condition (i) is met for virtually
all types of relative consumption concerns (the only exception is a situation where all
reference function derivatives but ∂h2/∂c1 are zero), Proposition 6 suggests that the public
provision of the positional good is particularly effective when income disparities are strong.
7 Conclusion
The public provision of specific private goods is often justified by paternalistic or merit
good arguments: from the perspective of some “outside observer” (e.g., the govern-
ment, an altruistic donor or even a person’s own future self) consumers spend insufficient
amounts of money on goods like education, health care or old-age consumption when left
to their own devices. In this paper, we offered a rationale for public provision that fully
respects individual preferences. People care about their relative standing and therefore
devote inefficiently high shares of their budgets to positional or status goods. By publicly
providing the goods and services that are underconsumed in the positional arms race,
governments can correct for the market inefficiency related to relative consumption con-
cerns and therefore induce Pareto-improvements. In contrast to paternalistic or merit
goods arguments, individuals would then agree to restrict consumer sovereignty by public
provision.
In addition to providing a new rationale for public provision, our paper contributes to ad-
dressing the more general question of policy design in the presence of consumer distortions
due to concern for relative standing. The recent empirical literature on conspicuous con-
sumption provides evidence that is consistent with the idea that positional spending and
status-seeking is particularly pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution: low-
income individuals devote a relatively large share of their income to positional spending
items at the expense of the less positional goods. Our analysis provides policy guidance
for such cases: then, publicly providing non-positional goods like basic education or health
insurance dominates a positional tax on luxury goods, a price instrument to counter the
positional externality. The reason is that public provision allows to target the poor sep-
arately, provided that the demand for non-positional goods is increasing in income. Our
paper can therefore be seen as contributing to the general question of the relative merits
of price vs. quantity instruments, which has recently received considerable attention in
the broader field of behavioral economics (see, e.g., Farhi and Gabaix, 2015).
It should be noted that our results are derived from a stylized model, where apart from
social comparisons no further source of market or policy inefficiency exists. If, for example,
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we allowed for endogenous labor supply, then our sufficient conditions would have to be
adjusted by the distortionary effects of the income taxation needed to finance public
provision. The same applies when having more than two goods. In this case, the scope
for public provision is somewhat reduced, as only those of the non-positional goods that
are not too complementary to the consumption of positional goods are able to induce
Pareto-improvements. Our main insights, however, that public provision can be Pareto-
improving under relative consumption concerns and that public provision is a particularly
effective policy tool whenever there are behavioral “deficiencies” at the bottom of the
income distributions generalizes to richer frameworks.
Finally, though our study is normative in nature, we think that it may also provide a new
perspective on individuals’ voting incentives over public provision. In particular, forcing
the poor away from positional goods allows the rich to reduce the economic resources they
have to invest in maintaining their relative consumption position. Concerns for relative
standing may thus endow richer individuals with a motive to politically support social
benefits in kind, even when they are highly redistributive. Our analysis therefore suggests
that social comparisons may also affect the political economy of public provision – a topic
left for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Pareto-efficient allocations
We can identify Pareto-efficient allocations C∗ by maximizing U
1
∗ given that (i) U
2
∗ does
not fall below a level Ū2 and (ii) the economy’s resource constraint holds. Varying Ū2
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1, x1, c2) s.t. (28)




(yi − ci − xi) ≥ 0.
Since U1∗ is strongly quasi-concave and the constraint set is convex, closed, and bounded,
there exists a unique Pareto-efficient allocations for every given Ū2. Define P as the set
of allocations C∗ such that there exists Ū
2 and the allocation solves (28).
The Lagrangian for problem (28) is
L = U1∗ (c
1, x1, c2) + µ
[
U2∗ (c





(yi − ci − xi),
(29)
where µ and λ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the utility and resource
















− λ∗ = 0, (30)
∂L
∂x1












− λ∗ = 0, (32)
∂L
∂x2
= µ∗u2x − λ∗ = 0. (33)
From (31) and (33), we have λ∗ = u1x and µ
∗ = λ∗/u2x. Plugging these expressions into
(30) and (32) gives condition (8).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We have to prove that under the conditions stated in Proposition 1, there always exists a
policy P = (b1, b2, g) with g > 0 that achieves a Pareto-improvement over the laissez-faire
with PLF = (y
1, y2, 0). Consider the policy scheme where bi = yi − g for i = 1, 2. We will
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show that under this scheme, setting the public provision level g slightly above x1LF raises
the utility of at least one type compared to PLF if ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0.
To see this, note that with bi = yi − g, we have xd(bi + g) = xd(yi) = xiLF . Hence, an
individual of type i is crowded out by public provision if g ≥ xiLF . Consider a change




r, gr) = (y
1 − x1LF , y2 − x1LF , x1LF ). At Pr, both types
choose the same consumption bundle as in the laissez-faire: since gr = x
1
LF , by demand
functions (12) and (13), individuals of type 1 are just crowded out by public provision
and choose x1 (b1r, gr) = gr = x
1
LF and c
1 (b1r, gr) = b
1
r = y
1 − x1LF = c1LF . As y2 > y1, the
normality of good x implies gr < xd (y
2). Thus, demanded quantities of type 2 individuals
are c2 (b2r, gr) = cd (y
2) = c2LF and x
2 (b2r, gr) = xd (y
2) = x2LF . As a consequence, at Pr
each type’s utility is the same as in the laissez-faire. Substitution of policy Pr into the
government budget constraint yields y1 − c1LF − x1LF + y2 − c2LF − x2LF = 0. Therefore, Pr
is feasible.




p, gp) = (b
1
r + db
1, b2r + db
2, gr + dg),
where dg > 0 and dg → 0. As dbi = −dg for both types, policy Pp is feasible. Since
gp > x
1
LF , under the one-to-one policy scheme, individuals of type 1 remain crowded out
after the policy change. By the continuity of demand functions (12) and (13), individuals
of type 2 are not crowded out by public provision at Pp. Hence, at the two policies Pr
and Pp, both types’ demands are, respectively, given by c
1(b1, g) = b1, x1(b1, g) = g,
c2(b2, g) = xd(b
2 + g) and x2(b2, g) = xd(b
2 + g). Inserting these demands into (14) gives
indirect utilities
V 1(b1, b2, g) =u(b1, g) + b1 − h1(b1, cd(b2 + g)), (34)
V 2(b2, b1, g) =u(cd(b
2 + g), xd(b
2 + g)) + cd(b
2 + g)− h2(cd(b2 + g), b1). (35)
Using bi = yi− g, the change in indirect utilities induced by the switch from policy Pr to
Pp can be represented by differentiating (34) and (35) with respect to g at Pr:
dV 1
dg










Since −(uic + 1) + uix = 0 at Pr (see the first-order condition (11)) and ∂h1/∂c1 ≥ 0 and
∂h2/∂c1 ≥ 0, dV 1/dg ≥ 0 and dV 2/dg ≥ 0. Hence, no income type is worse off when g
is raised slightly above x1LF . If ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0, dV i/dg > 0 for at least one
type, and Pp achieves a Pareto-improvement over PLF . This proves the proposition. 
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A.3 Proofs for section 3
A.3.1 Derivations for KUJ and RAJ
We will show that the sign of ∂MRS(ci, xi, ri)/∂ri is equivalent to the sign of ∂cid/∂r
i if
an individual is not constrained by public provision, i.e., if xi > g. To see this, consider
individuals’ maximization problem for a given g:
max
ci,xi
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) s.t. (ci, xi) ∈ B̃ig. (38)
A solution to (38) with xi > g must satisfy
−Ũ ic + Ũ ix = 0 and ci + xi = yi. (39)




Ũ icr − Ũ ixr
−Ũ icc + 2Ũ icx − Ũ ixx
, (40)
where we abbreviated Ũ icc := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c2, Ũ icx := ∂2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c∂x,
Ũ ixx := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂x2, Ũ icr := ∂2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c∂r, and
Ũ ixr := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂x∂r. Since Ũ is strongly quasi-concave, the denominator in
(40) is positive (Barten and Böhm, 1982). The sign of ∂ci/∂ri is therefore determined by
the sign of Ũ icr − Ũ ixr. It remains to be shown that ∂MRSi (ci, xi, ri) /∂ri > (<) 0 ⇐⇒





















x = 1 at a solution to (38), ∂MRS
i (ci, xi, ri) /∂ri > (<) 0⇐⇒ ∂ci/∂ri > (<
) 0.
A.3.2 Proof of local uniqueness
To prove that Assumption 1 implies local uniqueness of equilibria, rewrite (20) as F (r, g) =
0, where F : R2 × R1 → R2, (r, g) 7→ F (r, g) = (F1(r, g), F2(r, g)) with Fi(r, g) =
ri−hi(ci(g, ri), cj(g, rj)). By the continuity of demand functions and hi, F is continuous.
However, as demand functions are not differentiable at points where g = xid(y
i, ri) for
one or both types, the standard implicit function theorem does not apply. However, local
uniqueness can be ensured by applying an implicit function theorem for non-differentiable
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mappings by Kumagai (1980).
To see this, let (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) be a point such that F (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) = 0. If there exist open
neighborhoods of (r̂1, r̂2) and ĝ on which F (·, g) is locally one-to-one, the theorem ensures
that we can express references levels as an implicit function of g. When no individual is
crowded out at (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) (which includes the laissez-faire with g = 0), F (·, g) is locally
one-to-one: by Assumption 1, the determinant of the Jacobian of F with respect to r,
given by A, is non-zero such that F is invertible. Now consider a solution to F (r, g) = 0
where one type i is just crowded out (g = xid(y
i, ri)). If we go into an ε-environment of ĝ
and keep r fixed at (r̂1, r̂2), type i will either be strictly crowded out (g > xd(y
i, ri)) or
she will top up (g < xid(y
i, ri)). This will remain true for a sufficiently close ball around
(r̂1, r̂2). Since in either of these cases, the determinant of the Jacobian of F with respect
to r exists and has the same sign, we can conclude that F is also one-to-one around a
solution where F (r, g) = 0 is non-differentiable. Hence, Kumagai’s theorem applies, and
the equilibria are locally unique. 
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 1. Consider a given (r̂1, r̂2) ∈
















Set the public provision level to gr = x
1
LF . By the assumption that reference levels do
not jump, policy gr leads to the same consumption allocation CLF as in the laissez-faire;
as gr = x
1
LF , by demand functions (18) and (19), individuals of type 1 choose c
1(gr, r̂
1) =
y1 − gr = c1LF and x1(gr, r̂1) = gr = x1LF . Since x1d(y1, r1) < x2d(y2, r2) by assumption,
we have gr < x
2
LF . Hence, individuals of type 2 choose c
2(gr, r̂
2) = c2d(y
2, r̂2) = c2LF and
x2(gr, r̂
2) = c2d(y
2, r̂2) = x2LF . Therefore, at gr, individuals of type 1 [type 2] are [not]
crowded out by public provision, and system (20) reads
r1 − h1(y1 − g, c2LF ) = 0
r2 − h2(c2LF , y1 − g) = 0.
(42)
Given (r̂1, r̂2), indirect utilities can be expressed as
V 1(g) = U(y1 − g, g,∆1(y1 − g, r̂1(g))), (43)
V 2(g) = U(c2d(y
2, r̂(g)), x2d(y
2, r̂(g)),∆2(c2d(y
2, r̂(g)), r̂2(g))). (44)
Consider a change in the public provision level from gr to gp = gr + dg, where dg > 0 and
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by Assumption 1. Using (45), (46) and the first-order conditions of the individual maxi-
mization problems (38), the change in indirect utilities induced by the change from gr to




























where U i∆ := ∂U(c
i, xi,∆i)/∂∆ and (47) and (48) are evaluated at gr. Under KUJ,
∂c2d/∂r
2 > 0. Hence, dV 1/dg and dV 2/dg are non-negative at gr. If ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0 or
∂h2/∂c1 > 0, we have dV 1 > 0 or dV 2 > 0.
To complete the proof, we have to show that individuals of type 1 [type 2] are still
[not] crowded out by public provision after the policy change from gr to gp. As demand
functions are continuous and we require x2LF > x
1
LF , individuals of type 2 are not crowded
out by public provision at gp. Type 1 individuals remain crowded out if the difference
Ω1(g, r1) := g−x1d (y1, r1) is greater or equal to zero at gp (see demand functions (18) and
(19)). This holds if




dr1 ≥ 0, (49)




























































Dividing by D1 and rearranging leads to (51). Hence, individuals of type 1 stay crowded
out after the change to policy Pp. This proves Proposition 2. 
A.4 Derivation of optimal consumption taxes in the absence of
public provision
The solution to the individual maximization problem (6) with each individual’s budget
set given by (23) must satisfy the first-order conditions







Demand functions for goods c and x can be expressed as follows:
ci(bi, g, p) =

cd(b
i + g, p) if g < xd(b
i + g, p),
bi/p if g ≥ xd(bi + g, p),
(54)
xi(bi, g, p) =

xd(b
i + g, p) if g < xd(b
i + g, p),
g if g ≥ xd(bi + g, p).
(55)
The functions cd(I, p) and xd(I, p) again give individuals’ ordinary or unconstrained de-
mands, and solve problem (6) for Bu := {(c, x) : pc+ x ≤ I}. Using that p = p(t), we
define the indirect utility of type i as
V i(bi, bj, g, p(t)) := ui(ci(bi, g, p(t)), xi(bi, g, p(t))) + ci(bi, g, p(t)) (56)
− hi(ci(bi, g, p(t)), cj(bj, g, p(t))).
Optimal policies in the absence of public provision solve
max
b1,b2,t
V 1(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) s.t. (57)
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(i) : V 2(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) ≥ Ū2,
(ii) : y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2 ≥ 0.
We define S as the set of policies P0 = (b10, b20, 0, t0) such that there exists a level Ū2 and
the policy solves (57).
Denote the Lagrangian to problem (57) by
L = V 1(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) + µ
[




y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2
]
, (58)
where µ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (i) and (ii) of






























































































where p0 = 1 + t0. Solving (59) and (60) for µ












































































































































In (66) and (67), c̃ i (p, g, v̄i) denotes individual i’s Hicksian or compensated demand
function for good c for a given utility level v̄i.31 The assumption that U i∗ increases in c
i
implies that the terms in parentheses in (66) and (67) are, respectively, positive. Since






(65) can be written as in (24), the optimal positional tax formula.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an optimal policy P0 ∈ S. If Γ1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0 at P0, (24) implies t0 =
Γ1|C=C0 = Γ




0) = 1 + t0.




0) − Γi|C=C0 = 1 for i = 1, 2, which coincides with
(8). As the utility function U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave, any allocation that satisfies (8)
is Pareto-efficient. Conversely, if Γ1|C=C0 6= Γ
2|C=C0 at P0, we have MRS(c
i, xi)−Γi 6= 1
for at least one type, and condition (8) does not hold. Hence, policy P0 implements an
efficient allocation if and only if Γ1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0 . 
31Formally, c̃ i (p, g, v̄) are obtained from the expenditure minimization problem
min
ci,xi
p · ci + xi − g s.t. ui(ci, xi) + ci − ri ≥ v̄i, (68)
xi ≥ g, ci ≥ 0.
Given our assumptions on preferences, there exists a unique c̃ i(p, g, v̄i) for every (p, g, v̄i).
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4




r, gr, tr) with
b1r = b
1
0 − gr, b2r = b20 − gr, gr = x10, tr = t0. (69)
At Pr, we have xd(b
1
r + gr, pr) = xd(b
1




r + gr, pr) = xd(b
2
0, p0) = x
2
0.




0, by (54) and (55), it follows that types 1 and 2 respectively choose
c1(b1r, gr, pr) = br/pr = c
1
0, x
1(b1r, gr, pr) = gr = x
1
0, c
2(b2r, gr, pr) = cd(b
2
0, p0) = c
2
0 and
x2(b2r, gr, pr) = xd(b
2
0, p0) = x
2
0. Thus, consumption allocations and individuals’ indirect
utilities at P0 and Pr coincide. Substitution of policy Pr into the government budget
constraint (22) shows that policy Pr is feasible. Since individuals of type 1 [type 2] are
[not] constrained by public provision at Pr, indirect utilities and the government budget
at Pr are
V 1(b1, b2, g, p) =u(b1/p, g) + b1/p− h1(b1/p, cd(b2 + g, p)), (70)
V 2(b2, b1, g, p) =u(cd(b
2 + g, p), xd(b
2 + g, p)) (71)
+ cd(b
2 + g, p)− h2(cd(b2 + g, p), b1/p),
G =y1 − b1 + tb1/p+ y2 − b2 + tcd(b2 + g, p)− 2g. (72)




2, gr+dg, p0), where dg > 0
and dg → 0. Net incomes are adjusted such that (i) the government budget G remains
balanced and (ii) the indirect utility of type 2 does not change. The consumption tax is
held constant at t = t0. Using (71) and (72), requirements (i) and (ii) can be represented
by








































dg = 0, (74)
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where we abbreviated ∂cid/∂I := ∂cd(b
i+g, p)/∂I and used that (u2c + 1)/u
2
x = p at policy
Pr. Solving for db




























































 > 0. (77)
The first term in (77) is positive as U i∗ increases in c
i. The same holds for the second term
since (−1 + t∂c2d/∂I) < 0.32
The policy change from Pr to Pp achieves a Pareto-improvement if the indirect utility
of type 1 increases. Totally differentiating (70), using (70), (75), (76), the definitions
of Γ1 and Γ2, the expression for the optimal tax (24), while taking into account that
consumption allocations at P0 and Pr coincide, we obtain






















































The sign of D4 follows since, at the optimal policy P0, the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the government budget constraint, λ0, must be larger than zero (see equation 63).
Thus, dV 1 > 0 if Γ1 > Γ2 at P0.
32From individuals’ budget constraint, cd(I
2, p) = 1/p(I2 − xd(I2, p)). Differentiating with respect to












As both goods are normal, we must have (−1 + t∂c2d/∂I) < 0.
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It remains to show that individuals of type 1 [type 2] are [not] crowded out by public
provision if we change the policy from Pr to Pp. By the continuity of demand functions,
this is satisfied for type 2. Individuals of type 1 are crowded out at Pp if the difference
Ω1(b1, g, p) := g − x1d (b1 + g, p) is greater or equal to zero after the change to policy Pp.






















The first term of the right-hand side of (79) is positive as both goods are normal. The
sign of the second term follows since db1 < 0 by (75). Hence, type 1 individuals remain
crowded out at Pp. As similar arguments apply for all P0 ∈ S, this finishes the proof of
Proposition 4. 
A.7 Example 2
Assume that the sub-utility function u and reference functions hi are respectively given
by






− ri, h1(c1, c2) = c2, h2(c2, c1) = 0.
Hence, Γ2 > Γ1 = 0. We choose parameters y1 = 10, y2 = 15, σ = 0.8 and δ = 0.4.
Setting Ū2 = 10.7189 to laissez-faire level enjoyed by the rich, the optimal tax in the
absence of public provision is t0 = 1.04, and the poor obtain indirect utility V
1 = −0.35.
Now, consider a switch to a policy P ′ = (b1, b2, g, 0), where b1 = y1 − 1.1g, b2 = y2 − 0.9g
and g = 6.05. Under this policy, both types are constrained by public provision and
obtain utilities V 1 = −0.32 and V 2 = 10.7193. Hence, under policy P ′, the poor and the
rich are better off compared to P0.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider a given Pareto-efficient allocation C∗ ∈ P .













∗ − g∗, g∗ = x1∗. (80)




∗) if they are (just) constrained





∗) ≥ 1. (81)
From condition (8) we know that MRS(c1∗, x
1
∗) = 1+Γ
1. Hence, as Γ1 > 0, condition (81)
holds. Individuals of type 2 can afford their intended bundle: by (80), their disposable
income is effectively I2∗ = b
2





we consider only C∗ ∈ P where x1∗ < x2∗, by demand functions (12) and (13), we have
g < xd(I
2
∗ ) = x
2





is the optimal choice: utility-maximization requires MRS(c2, x2) = 1. By (8) and the
strict convexity of preferences, this condition can only hold at (c2∗, x
2
∗).







∗ − y1 − y2 = 0, (82)
which must hold for any C∗ and therefore proves feasibility.
To prove the “only if” part, note that if Γ2 > 0 policy P∗ can never implement C∗: as indi-
viduals of type 2 choose goods c and x according to MRS(c2, x2) = 1 and MRS(c2∗, x
2
∗) =




Furthermore, there exist no other policies that might lead to C∗. Implementation with
policies where g > x1∗ is impossible since, by monotonicity, individuals never forego the
publicly provided amount g. Hence, at least one income type would not consume the
efficient level of good x. We can also rule out policies where g < x1∗: if one or both types
are constrained, Pareto-efficiency cannot be attained when x1∗ < x
2
∗; if both individuals
are not crowded out, they would top up to a bundle that is not Pareto-efficient, since
both choose goods c and x such that MRS (ci, xi) = 1.




∗, g∗, t∗) with












We first show that individuals choose C∗ under P∗ if and only if Γ
1 > Γ2. We then verify
that P∗ is feasible if individuals were to choose C∗ under this policy. In a last step, we
prove that P∗ is the only policy that can achieve C∗.
To see that C∗ is consistent with utility maximization, consider first the decision problem
of type 1 individuals. The bundle (c1∗, x
1
∗) is affordable since g = x
1




is designed such that c1∗ can be just attained if x






∗) ≥ p = 1 + t∗. (84)




∗) − Γ2 ≥ 1. From condition
(8) we know that MRS(c1∗, x
1
∗) = 1+Γ
1. Thus, (c1∗, x
1
∗) is optimal for individuals of type 1
if and only if Γ1 ≥ Γ2.
The rich can also afford their intended bundle: by (83), their disposable income is effec-
tively I2∗ = b
2




∗). Moreover, since we consider only
C∗ ∈ P where x1∗ < x2∗, we have g < x2∗, and the rich are not constrained at P∗. Hence,
(c2∗, x
2
∗) is the optimal choice: utility-maximization requires MRS(c
2, x2) = p = 1+ t∗. As
t∗ = Γ
2, by (8) this condition can only hold at (c2∗, x
2
∗).







∗ − y1 − y2 = 0, (85)
which must hold for any C∗ and therefore proves feasibility.
P ∗ is the only policy that may support C∗. Implementation with policies where g > x
1
∗ is
impossible since, by monotonicity, individuals never forego the publicly provided amount
g. Hence, at least one income type would not consume the efficient level of good x. We
can also rule out policies where g < x1∗: if one or both types are constraint, Pareto-
efficiency cannot be attained when x1∗ < x
2
∗; if both individuals are not crowded out, they
would top-up to a bundle that is not Pareto-efficient, since in the case where Γ1 6= Γ2, the
uniform tax rate can never be set such that private optimization yield MRS + Γi = 1 for
i = 1, 2 for any given net incomes. 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6






1 − er; b2r = y2. (86)
This policy induces individuals to choose the same consumption bundles as in the laissez-
faire. Since ê(b1r, p) < cd(b
1
r, p) < cd(y
1, p) = c1LF , type 1 individuals choose public
provision at Pr. Hence, c
1(b1r, p, er) = er = c
1
LF and x





sume that c1LF < ê
2(y2, p). Then, individuals of type 2 opt out and, as b2r = y
2, select
c2(b2r, p, er) = c
2
LF and x




Now, marginally decrease e at Pr and finance it by de = −db1. By the continuity of utility
functions, type 2 stays out of the public system after this policy change. The effect on
both types’ indirect utilities is








Hence, decreasing e benefits at least one type if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0.
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